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1The Governance of Military Police in
Canada
ANDREW HALPENNY*
The Military Police is a special federal police force in Canada with unique authority, de-
signed to support military commanders both in operations and in garrison. However, it has
historically been under the command of non-Military Police officers, and is consequently
not governed like other police forces in Canada. Part of this arrangement can be explained
by its special military duties, but much of it is the result of a tradition that is at odds with
current societal norms. It is the position of the author that differences in norms between
the Military Police and other Canadian police forces can only be justified by bona fide miti-
tary requirements. This article proposes pragmatic changes that would see the Canadian
Forces Provost Marshal, who is the senior Military Police officer of the Canadian Forces.
command all Military Police. Their duties and functions, however, would be guided by a
newly established Military Police Services Board. This Board would provide transparent
policy guidance and require equally transparent accountability from the Military Police in a
manner that respects the norms of Canadian law and other police services.
La Police militaire est une force de police f6derate sp6ciate au Canada dotee d'une autorit6
exclusive visant a appuyer les commandants militaires, tant dans Les op6rations que dans
les garnisons. Cependant, sur le plan historique, etle a et sous le commandement de
policiers non militaires et, par consequent, non dirig6e comme les autres services de
police au Canada. Cette organisation peut s'expliquer en partie par ses fonctions militaires
particulieres, mais decoute dans une grande mesure principalement d'une tradition qui est
a Uoppos6 des normes soci6tates actuelles. C'est ['opinion de lauteur voulant que les
normes diff6rentes entre La Police militaire et Les autres services de police canadiens peu-
vent seutement se justifier par les exigences militaires de bonne foi. Le present article
propose des modifications pragmatiques qui verraient le Grand prev6t des Forces cana-
diennes, soit lofficier senior de [a police militaire des Forces canadiennes, commander
[ensemble de La Police militaire. Cependant, leurs obligations et fonctions seraient
orient6es par un Conseil des services de La police militaire (Military Police Services Boardl
* CD, B.A. (Manitoba), LL.B. (Queen's), LL.M. (Ottawa). Legal officer in the Office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces. I served for many years as an infantry
officer prior to becoming a lawyer. I am currently a legal adviser for the Canadian Forces
Provost Marshal where I advise on legal and policy matters relating to the Military Police.
The views expressed here are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence, or the Canadian Forces.
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qui a 6te r6cemment mis sur pied. Ce conseil procurerait une orientation de politique
transparente et exigerait 6gaLernent une responsabilisation transparente de [a part de La
Police militaire, d une maniere qui respecte les normes de La l6gislation et des autres ser-
vices de police.
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IN A POLICING CONTEXT, many would be surprised to find a police force where
members do not work for the chief of police, municipal councils and govern-
ment ministers can directly task individual police officers, and those councillors
and ministers would personally decide on the merit of the officer and whether
he or she is deserving of promotion. And yet, in the Canadian Forces, the Mili-
tary Police (MP) work in a structure that effectively produces these scenarios on
a daily basis. This is in spite of jurisprudence which stands for the proposition
that, at a minimum, the police have significant independence from govern-
ment.' Academic writings argue for a nuanced relationship between govern-
ment and police to ensure accountability through oversight and review. None,
however, suggest that the relationship should be exercised through anyone other
than the chief of police.' And no police force operates other than under the
direction of the chief of police.3 Numerous commissions of inquiry in Canada
1. R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 [Campbell].
2. See Part Il(G), below, for an analysis of current literature.
3. See e.g. Royal Canadian MountedPoliceAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10, s. 5(1) [RCMPAct]; Police
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have looked into the important relationship between government and police,
including one inquiry that dealt with the MP. These sources of law, theory,
and commission recommendations provide important standards to test the ac-
countability of this special police force.
Seventeen years have now passed since the tragic events of Operation DE-
LIVERANCE when the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was involved
in the unlawful killing of a local boy during its peace enforcement mission in
Somalia.' The Inquiry that examined this 1993 incident issued a damning report,
raising concerns that low-level commanders had too much influence over MP who
were impeded in their investigations of the crime.' Today, commanders continue
to directly command most MP in the Canadian Forces and control policing
priorities and tasks. Further, they assess the suitability of MP members for promo-
tion. All of this appears to be at odds with generally accepted policing standards.
No significant incident such as what happened in Somalia has recurred in the
Forces. Additionally, the MP has since evolved and become much more profes-
sional in all aspects of policing. However, important differences of opinion exist
within the Canadian Forces about the best command structure for the MP, with
some commanders insisting on the continuing importance of their direct control
of MP, and others advocating for the centralization of all such policing under MP
officers.' Before other problems arise, we should assess the command and control
arrangements of MP using civilian policing standards of governance as a model.
This is all the more important because of the very high operational rate at which
the Canadian Forces is being used in many countries, particularly in Afghanistan.
High-level activities like these operations raise more opportunities to expose
organizational weaknesses that may lead to failure. The law and the Forces have
changed significantly since 1993. Now is the time to examine whether this special
Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 17(2), 41(1) [Police Services Act].
4. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured
Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 1997) [Somalia Inquiry]. The Somalia Inquiry and others will be reviewed
below.
5. See ibid at 217-74. Chapters 11 and 12 detail the situation at the time in Somalia, including
the development and approval of the political and military plans.
6. See Part Ill(A), below, for more detail on the history of the mission and the findings and
recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry.
7. Ibid.
4 [2010 148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and crucial police force for the Canadian Forces reflects the best professional gov-
ernance standards which Canadians can rightfully expect, while continuing to
respond effectively to their military missions.
The MP, of course, are special because their primary function is to assist
military commanders in enforcing discipline of Canadian Forces members.' They
have limited jurisdiction over persons who are not Forces members, and they are
ultimately part of the larger Canadian Forces, which is responsible to the federal
government for national defence matters. Additionally, they have unique duties
which differ significantly from that of civilian police, whose role is to prevent
crimes and keep the peace amongst a civilian population to whom they, in turn,
are ultimately responsible. Thus, any analysis of how MP should be governed
must bear this seminal difference in mind. Further, an analysis of governance
relating to MP must accommodate the unique structure of the Forces. For exam-
ple, government per se has no relationship with the MP, unlike the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP)," since all government direction must flow through the
Canadian Forces's most senior commander, the Chief of the Defence Staff."o How-
ever, the non-MP commanders who oversee MP perform an executive function
through the execution of their duties. Their authority to issue lawful orders sug-
gests that standards applicable to government may be applied by analogy to them.
This article will examine both the law and theory of police governance in
Canada to test it against the current situation in the Forces. The purpose is to
propose a model of governance and oversight that responds effectively and effi-
ciently to military commanders while reflecting Canadian police governance
standards. I argue that where there is no bona fide military reason to depart from
civilian standards, they should be applied to the MP. In addressing this purpose,
Part I will set -the groundwork with a brief account of the evolution of the modern
common law police constable, followed by the early developments of the MP in
Canada. Part II will introduce the key issues of police governance, police duties,
and the development of the concept of police independence and the jurisprudence
pertaining to it. In the same Part, I will provide an overview of governance struc-
tures including police services boards, and the challenges facing governance, as well
8. Canada, National Defence, Military Police (B-GL-362-001/FP-001) (Ottawa: Department
of National Defence, 2000) at 17-19.
9. RCMPAct, supra note 3, s. 5(1).
10. NationalDefence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, s. 18.
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as a review of the current literature pertaining to it. Part III returns to a detailed
analysis of the MP situation today. I will propose fundamental changes in the
structure and oversight of the MP that will better reflect Canadian legal standards
and expectations, yet continue to address bona fide military requirements.
The result will highlight the recommendation that command of all MP should
rest with the senior MP officer of the Forces known as the Canadian Forces Provost
Marshal (CFPM). However, the CFPM will be accountable to the Chief of the
Defence Staff through a newly established Military Police Services Board that will
determine MP priorities, resources, and policies. By implementing such a model,
it is proposed that potential problems will be averted, the MP will be reinvigorated
by a more relevant command structure, and better police accountability will be
realized through more effective oversight. The CFPM will be wholly responsible
for the standards of MP training and professionalism in the Forces, and com-
manders will have significant influence over the prioritization of tasks and the
allocation of resources to support their operational requirements, all the while
respecting the importance of independence of the MP where necessary.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY POLICE
To begin an examination of the governance of MP, it is important to see how both
the civilian police and the MP have evolved. The genesis, purpose, and organization
of these two branches of policing tell an insightful story about society's concerns
and ideals. A study of the evolution of the civilian police and the MP can illu-
minate the values that were prevalent when policing emerged as a profession
through the study of their organizational and ideological imperatives. These
imperatives continue to be reflected to various degrees in our police services,
academic theories, jurisprudence, and the law today. This background will show
why we are in our present state of policing. With the establishment of this "start
state," we will have the bedrock upon which to build the future for a more respon-
sive and accountable MP.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN POLICE
Policing traditions in Canada trace their roots to developments in England
because of Canada's colonial and Commonwealth heritage links to Great Britain.
As will be shown, this tradition differs in important ways from the European police
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models. Two main streams of policing evolved over the centuries and were brought
to and continue in Canada today: the constabulary model and the paramilitary
model. Parishes in England developed the constabulary model, whereas the British
Crown instituted the paramilitary model in 1814 with the establishment of the
Royal Irish Constabulary.
In early days, towns provided their own "night watch" to keep the peace and
to provide a guard for the village from outside marauders. Parishes eventually
established constables who were generally of a higher quality than those watch-
men," although they, too, left much to be desired. This was because each parish
operated independently of the others. The constables normally lacked training and
were privately raised and funded (although not necessarily paid). As a result of all
this, by the eighteenth century there was a push in Great Britain to professionalize
the parish constables and to do away with the town watchmen. However, this was
met with significant political opposition, as the British jealously guarded against
encroachments on their local autonomy.
The introduction of the word "police" was one of the political manoeuvres of
the day to convince communities to give up some of their parochial control and to
allow more standardization. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, chaired
a parliamentary committee that led to the formation of the Metropolitan Police
upon the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1829.12 The word "police" comes
from the French language, which in turn derives from the medieval Latin word
"politia," meaning policy." At the time of the reforms in England, the word "po-
lice" was used only in continental Europe, where those police were responsible to
their central governments. But control by the British Crown of local matters was
something from which the English historically balked. However, the new use of
"police" was adopted to distinguish it from the previous non-professional watches
and constables. "Police" was used more as a verb or adverb to denote "the arrange-
ments made in all civilised countries to ensure that the inhabitants keep the peace
and obey the law. The word also denotes the force of peace officers (or police)
11. Barry S. Godfrey, Chris A. Williams & Paul Lawrence, History & Crime (London: SAGE
Publications, 2008) at 56-57.
12. (U.K.), 10 Geo. IV, c. 44.
13. The Concise Canadian Oxford Dictionary, s.v. "police."
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employed for this purpose."" Even today, the name "constable" is more commonly
used to refer to the individual, whereas the service is known as the police.
The paramilitary Royal Irish Constabulary, on the other hand, had the role
of ensuring the British Crown's dominion in Ireland and the application of British,
as opposed to Irish, laws. The Royal Irish Constabulary was a paramilitary organiza-
tion in that it was based on a strong centralized hierarchy, used military ranks and
military-styled uniforms, and had members who lived throughout the land in
barracks." It became an effective and efficient force, which led to its emulation
by several of the British Empire's colonies, including Newfoundland with its Royal
Newfoundland Constabulary, and the Victoria Police of Australia. Following Con-
federation, Canada adopted the Royal Irish Constabulary model when it formed
the North West Mounted Police for colonizing the Western territories." Provin-
cial police forces have followed the paramilitary model as well." The feature
which distinguishes the two, historically at least, is that constables or local police
respond locally, whereas paramilitary federal or provincial police enforce dominion
authority. With this brief historical account of the development of civilian police,
we will now look to the development of Canada's MP. The comparison will high-
light the historical differences in the role of each, which goes a long way in ex-
plaining the gap between the respective current concepts of governance. Once we
understand the extent and content of the gap, we will be in a better position to
accept as legitimate the bona fide military requirements necessitating those differ-
ences for the MP, or to critique its governance structures where those differences
are not justifiable.
14. Metropolitan Police "History of the Metropolitan Police," online: <http://www.met.police.uk/
history/definition.htm>.
15. Royal Irish Constabulary, online: <http://www.royalirishconstabulary.com>.
16. Ibid. See also DeLloyd J. Guth, "The Traditional Common Law Constable, 1235-1829:
From Bracton to the Fieldings to Canada" in R. C. Macleod & David Schneiderman, eds.,
Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and Practice ofAuthority (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1994) 3.
17. Although there were many more in earlier days, only Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland
have continued to have provincial police since the 1930s. In the other provinces, the RCMP
act as provincial police and, in numerous cases, as municipal police. They also share
provincial policing responsibilities with the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary outside of
major communities. The RCMP also serve as the police force for the territories.
8 (20101 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
B. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY POLICE IN CANADA"
Military police have roots which go back to the earliest era of military history and
are linked to the title of "provost marshal," the head of the MP." By the time of
the Norman invasion of England in 1066, the duties began to coalesce into a
comparable concept of policing duties as continues today, if in a form which some
might now find objectionable. Throughout English history, the provost or pro-
vost marshal was linked very closely with the Sovereign. In fact, the provost's role
in maintaining order was so important that, in earlier times, the Sovereign ap-
pointed him personally. The term "provost" was used for MP members in the
Canadian Army until the unification of the three armed services (navy, air force,
and army) in 1968. Recently, the tide of Provost Marshal has been reintroduced
to describe the head of Military Police elements such as the Army Provost Mar-
shal or the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Provost Marshal. History and tradi-
tion play an important role in the Canadian Forces.
In spite of the fact that the role of the MP has traditionally included those
duties which civilian police commonly perform (i.e., keeping the peace and
enforcing the laws), those duties have never been a large part of MP tasks. Par-
ticularly during times of war, the main duties of the MP have been taken up with
prisoner control and detention, traffic control (for the large and complex army
movements on the battlefield), and straggler and refugee control. Straggler control
18. See Lieutenant Commander A.N. Gale, Governance ofthe Canadian Forces Military Police
(M.D.S. Thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2002) [unpublished]. Most of this section relies
on this work, which contains detailed notes and bibliography. See also Canadian Forces
Provost Marshal, "History of the Canadian Military Police Branch," online: <http://www.
vcds.forces.gc.calcfpm-gpfc/apm-agp/hcmpb-hbpmc-eng.asp>; Andrew R. Ritchie,
Watchdog: A History of the Canadian Provost Corps (Burlington: Canadian Provost Corps
Association, 1995); and Major QE. Lawson, "A Very Short History - The Canadian
Provost Corps" (1955) 9 Can. Army J. 156.
19. Black's Law Dictionary,*8th ed., s.v. "Provost-Marshal." According to the definition, "[i]n
military law, the officer acting as the head of the military police .... under martial law. He, or
his assistants may, at any time, arrest and detain for trial, persons subject to military law
committing offenses." Cf National Defence Act, supra note 10, s. 156:
Officers and non-commissioned members who are appointed as military police under
regulations for the purposes of this section may (a) detain or arrest without a warrant any
person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, regardless of the person's rank or
status, who has committed, is found committing, is believed on reasonable grounds to be
about to commit or to have committed a service offence or who is charged with having
committed a service offence.
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involves reuniting soldiers separated from their units-often, although not exclu-
sively-as a result of dislocation during battle. The more "hard" policing duties
during war involve criminal investigations and apprehending deserters. Garrison
duties on military bases in peace time involve more traditional policing such as
criminal and service offence investigations, keeping the peace duties, and army
base security duties. The essential difference between civilian police and MP is
that, whereas the duties of civilian police include the preservation of the peace,
prevention of crime, and protection of life and property of the citizenry,20 the role
of MP is ultimately to support military commanders to enforce discipline amongst
their troops and to support battlefield operations. They are responsible and
responsive to their commanders, not the community in which they work, except
indirectly. This difference in purpose is vital as we consider the law and theory
of police governance in relation to MP, since the governance models upon which
we must rely are exclusively civilian-based. Recognizing this difference is crucial
because it ultimately impacts the recommendations for reform.
The Royal Canadian Navy was the first service in Canada to have an official
policing component. It was called the Shore Patrol and commenced at the Navy's
inception in 1910 for the purpose of maintaining discipline of sailors, although
dockyard security was left to the RCMP. In the latter part of World War I, the
Canadian Military Police Corps was raised for the Army, but disbanded at the war's
end. In World War II, RCMP volunteers formed 1 Provost Company shortly after
the outbreak of the conflict in September 1939. This effectively started the new
Corps of Military Police in the Canadian Army. Similarly, the Royal Canadian
Air Force formed its own police force for air base security with a senior staff officer
overseeing its management at Air Force headquarters in Ottawa.
The three military services were amalgamated in 1968 into one, which is
commonly referred to as the Canadian Forces.21 Part of that process involved
uniting trades from the three services that performed similar duties, such as logis-
tics, medical, administration, and military policing. The MP then formed into a
new organization called the Security Branch. Following unification, recruiting,
selection, personnel management, and training were managed outside of the Secu-
rity Branch, meaning that decisions on crucial issues of competency and policing
standards were in the hands of non-MP personnel. Further, in the tradition of the
20. See Part 11(A), below.
21. National DefenceAct, supra note 10, s. 14.
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former services, MP were assigned to military bases under command of base com-
manders who were rarely, if ever, MP officers. Indeed, for many years, the senior
MP officer in the Canadian Forces was a staff officer rather than a commander.
General MP policies were managed, but not commanded, by National Defence
Headquarters in Ottawa.22 Although there were initiatives over the years to improve
the quality of policing and to address growing concerns that MP were too closely
linked to their commanders upon whom they relied, all attempts failed. The last
initiative took place at the time of the Somalia Affair and involved a study in 1996
called Operation THUNDERBIRD.23 Again, the former services preferred much
of the status quo including the retention of MP under their direct command. The
one exception, albeit an important one, with which the services agreed was the
placement of criminal investigators under the command of the senior MP of the
Canadian Forces.2 ' By this time, however, the impact of the Somalia Affair was
quickly overtaking the entire Forces. The MP were no exception.
Prior to investigating the impact that the Somalia Inquiry had on the MP
and its consequential evolution, we will examine the larger issues of police in-
dependence and governance in Canada. This is a broad topic, but one that is
fundamental to the understanding of society's historical and current views of the
relationship between government and police. It will provide the standards by which
to evaluate the current situation in the Forces. Further, such lacunae which may
be found in this comparison can then be addressed in a rigorous legal analysis.
22. See generally Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, c. 3, s. 2-Command,
online: <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qro-orf/vol-0 1 /index-eng.asp> [QRrOl. The
terms "commanders" and "staff' will be used frequently throughout this article.
Commanders have the direct respornsibility for subordinate military organizations and
personnel which have been assigned to them. They may issue lawful orders to those
subordinates, and they are responsible for their operational effectiveness, as well as their good
order and discipline. Staff, on the other hand, are assistants to commanders who advise and
execute that which supports a commander's requirements. Staff generally do not have
command authority on their own, although it is common for a commander to delegate
command responsibility to senior staff for efficiency purposes. See also Somalia Inquiry,
supra note 4 at 67-76 (for a helpful overview of command).
23. The thunderbird, which plays an important role for many Aboriginal peoples, is the symbol
of the Military Police Branch.
24. The designation of this title has changed numerous times over the years, but at least since the
early 1960s, the appointment has been a staff position in the National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) until recently. Recent changes are discussed below.
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II. INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNANCE
Governance relates to accountability. The issues that arise concerning govern-
ance of police relate to their place in society. For example, are they a part of
one of the branches of government or perhaps a fourth entity?" What degree of
control over them is appropriate, and by whom or through what organizations?
What should be the relationship between government26 and the police (i.e.,
how tied to direction should police be), or alternatively, under what condi-
tions, if any, may the executive issue binding direction to police? These gov-
ernance issues can be formulated in many different ways but are commonly
brought into focus through the use of the concept of "police independence." A
great deal of ink has been spilt trying to grapple with this latter subject. As will
be shown, attempting to succinctly encapsulate the concept of independence as
it relates to police governance is like relying on automobile bumper stickers to
understand theological and philosophical concepts; it is not reasonably possible.
The term is useful, nonetheless, as a short-hand expression which relates to the
central issue of policing governance, including that of the MP. Consequently,
while burrowing through the numerous theories and positions outlined below,
perhaps the issue can be posited in the following way: What should the rela-
tionship of MP be with their commanders to ensure that they can effectively
police without improper interference, and yet be responsive to legitimate mili-
tary needs? To understand this central relationship, we must first review the
role of the police.
A. POLICE DUTIES
Although the role of the police has evolved over the centuries and its duties are
now governed primarily in Canada by statute, its simple common law origins
provide the essence: "Police duties, at common law, include 'the preservation of
the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property."'27
Statutory direction provides little more to this broad authority, which is
understandable considering the myriad of situations to which police are required
25. The other three being the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.
26. "Government" is used here in an expansive manner to indicate the legitimate political
controlling agency at the federal, provincial, or municipal levels.
27. R. v. Clayton, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 at para. 69, citing Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
2 at para. 14.
12 12010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
to respond.28 In fact, legislation more commonly restrains than grants
additional police powers.29
The very essence of such broad and generally defined powers means that
police must have considerable discretion, and it is the use and abuse of such
discretion that attract attention from governments and citizens who seek their
accountability. Although police are sworn to uphold the law, they normally
have the discretion to decide when, how, and even if laws will be enforced. This
discretion was the basis of the application for a writ of mandamus, which was at
the heart of what is perhaps English jurisprudence's best known case dealing
with policing independence, R. v. Police Commissioner of the Metropolis, Exparte
Blackburn." In declining to issue the writ to compel police action, the court
expounded on the importance of broad discretion being available to the Chief
Constable and the Chiefs independence from government and the courts. A
recent Canadian case came to a comparable conclusion where, in spite of the
application succeeding on the facts, the court made clear that interference in
police discretion is exceptional.3 ' This jurisprudence is naturally based on the
historically accepted principles of common law policing relating to their neces-
sary independence.
28. See e.g. Police Services Act, supra note 3, s. 4(2). See also Godfrey, Williams & Lawrence,
supra note 11 at 53-54.
29. See e.g. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 25. This section addresses the protection of
persons administering and enforcing the law. Section 25(4) speaks to justification in the use
of force, but with numerous restrictions. It does not permit the use of force perse, rather, the
law allows the use of force in restricted circumstances. Consequently, a peace officer may rely
on this section as a defence under the appropriate factual scenario (for example, to a charge
of assault causing bodily harm), but cannot use it as a specific authorization to use force.
30. [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.) [Blackburn].
31. 1536412 Ontario Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefi Council, [2008] O.J. No. 2286 at
para. 29 (Sup. Ct.). The judgment states, "[Tlhe police have the right to use their discretion
in the enforcement of the law and private property rights. A blanket refusal to assist a
property owner or a class of property owners, however, would be an abuse of that right." In
this case, Aboriginal peoples occupied and effectively claimed sovereignty over lands that
their ancestors had lawfully surrendered. They were found not to have any legitimate claim.
However, the police not only refused to assist the lawful owners in re-establishing their
peaceful possession of the lands, but also threatened the owners with arrest in spite of the
right of defence of real property found in the Criminal Code.
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B. INDEPENDENCE
With the advent of Sir Robert Peel's "new police" in 1829 came the introduction
of his "Peelian Principles,"3  otherwise known as Peel's Nine Principles," which
established the "citizen police," as they were referred to. Central to the Principles,
found in the fifth one, is the concept of impartiality: "Police seek and preserve
public favour not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating
absolute impartial service to the law."3' The essence of this concept is that the police
are one and the same as the citizens, but have the special duty of applying the law.
To do so effectively and "impartially," an ethos of being responsible only to the law
itself developed and was encouraged. Indeed, it was undoubtedly considered essen-
tial for the acceptance of the new police so that they would not be seen as privileg-
ing the interests of the military" or other special interests, including the ruling class.
Undoubtedly idealistic and probably ephemeral in nature, one commentator
described the citizen police and the independent nature of the British "Bobbie"
in the following way:
One of the most striking features of the behaviour of the British police is their suc-
cess in preventing their dependence on public approval from interfering with the ef-
ficiency of their service to Law, and thus overcoming what might appear, in the-
ory, to be a fundamental weakness of their organization. They never forget their
dependence on public approval, and they secure it, not by pandering to the local or
temporary demands of a section of the public at any temporary moment, but by a
strict impartiality in their behaviour, and by providing a consistent service of unbi-
ased support of laws, and resistance to their breach, regardless of the nature of just-
ness of the laws. The consistent aloofness of the police from political bias, and their
sustained indifference to any other aspect of a law than its need of being observed
32. See Susan A. Lentz & Robert H. Chaires, "The Invention ofPeel's Principles: A Study of
Policing 'Textbook' History" (2007) 35 J. Crim. J. 69. The origin of the listed principles is
debated, although it is conceded that Sir Robert Peel generally espoused such principles in
his various speeches and writings.
33. See New Westminster Police Services, "Sir Robert Peel's Nine Principles," online: <http://
www.nwpolice.org/peel.html>. Recall that Sir Robert's innovation was restricted to
municipal constables and did not address the paramilitary RIC in Ireland, which had been
recently formed. Inevitably, cross-pollination has occurred, but important governance
differences remain because of their distinction.
34. Ibid.
35. See Guth, supra note 16 at 7. Unlike many European countries, there was considerable
reluctance from the earliest of times in English history to use constables in any military
fashion or to use the military itself within the country.
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are frequently the cause of temporary embarrassment and unpopularity, but they
are the real foundation of the immense confidence with which the public regards
the police, and on which their value and their strength depend.
Consequently, the police have relied upon impartiality and the authority of
the rule of law as the basis for executing their duties and insisting upon a clear
separation from government involvement in their affairs. This approach has been
taken up in common law jurisprudence, although with questionable logic and
selective facts. However, the principle of policing independence, at least as it per-
tains to law enforcement duties, still prevails in Canadian law.37
C. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POLICE INDEPENDENCE
The analysis begins with the leading case on police independence in Canada. R.
v. Campbell" was an appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, upholding a
General Division39 decision to deny a motion for stay of proceedings because of
a "reverse sting" in which police illegally sold a large amount of hashish to the
accused contrary to the Narcotics Control Act."o It was established that there was
no basis in law, in spite of the legal opinion upon which the police relied, that
allowed the RCMP to sell drugs even in such exigent circumstances where they
did so for the sole purpose of enforcing the law. In anticipation of this ruling, the
Crown submitted that "even if the conduct of the RCMP was facially prohibited
by the terms of the Narcotics ControlAct, no offence was committed because mem-
bers of the RCMP are either part of the Crown or are agents of the Crown and
as such partake of the Crown's public interest immunity."" The Court replied that:
The Crown's attempt to identify the RCMP with the Crown for immunity pur-
poses misconceives the relationship between the police and the executive government
when the police are engaged in law enforcement. A police officer investigating a
crime is not acting as a government functionary or as an agent of anybody. He or she
36. Godfrey, Williams & Lawrence, supra note 11 at 55, citing Charles Reith, British Police and
the Democratic Ideal (London: Oxford University Press, 1943) at 7.
37. Campbell, supra note 1.
38. Ibid.
39. See Courts offustice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 1.1(1). The General Division is now
known as the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario.
40. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, as rep. by Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.
41. Campbell, supra note I at para. 26.
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occupies a public office initially defined by the common law and subsequently set out
in various statutes. In the case of the RCMP, one of the relevant statutes is now
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-10.42
The Court continued its analysis and limited these findings to criminal in-
vestigations since other provisions of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act" and
the Department of the Solicitor GeneralAct" provide the Solicitor General's duties
and function "extend to matters relating to the RCMP" in prescribed circum-
stances. 5 The Court found that, "it is therefore possible that in one or other of
its roles the RCMP could be acting in an agency relationship with the Crown.""
In making its findings, the Court relied in its analysis upon a number of generally
well-known Canadian and Commonwealth cases that dealt with the issue of
independence." We will now examine each of these to understand their reasoning
and the contexts in which they were decided. The reader should keep in mind, as
the Court readily admits, that most of the cases were civil matters relating to the
liability of respective municipalities for illegal activities or misfeasance of its police.
This is important when analyzing the scope and meaning of independence."
One of the earliest reported Commonwealth cases dealing with the legal re-
lationship between government and police was the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in McCleave Estate v. City ofMoncton." The Court dealt with an appeal
from the Supreme Court of New Brunswick en banc, which overturned a finding
of liability at trial that the City of Moncton was in a position of respondeat superior
(i.e., a position of vicarious liability because of a master/servant relationship)" in
relation to the misfeant Constable Belyea. The civil suit followed the quashing
of charges laid pursuant to the Canada Temperance Act" under which Consta-
ble Belyea purported to act in seizing the plaintiffs liquor from his hotel and
42. Ibid. at para. 27.
43. Supra note 3.
44. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-13, as rep. by Department ofPublic Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act,
S.C. 2005, c. 10, s. 37 [Public Safety Act].
45. Campbell, supra note I at para. 28.
46. Ibid. at para. 29.
47. Ibid at paras. 29-36.
48. See Part II(B), below.
49. (1902), 32 S.C.R. 106 [McCleave].
50. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. "respondeat superior."
51. R.S.C. 1886, c. 106.
16 12010) 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
destroying it. The trial court awarded $300 in damages. In dismissing the ap-
pellant's action, the Court cited with approval the ruling in the American case
from 1861 of Buttrick v. The City of Lowell" which held in part:
Police officers can in no sense be regarded as agents or officers of the city. Their du-
ties are of a public nature. Their appointment is devolved on cities and towns by the
legislature as a convenient mode of exercising a function of government, but this
does not render them liable for their unlawfil or negligent acts. The detection and ar-
rest of offenders, the preservation of the public peace, the enforcement of the laws
and other similar powers and duties with which police officers and constables are en-
trusted are derived from the law, and not from the city or town under which they hold
their appointment.s5
Further, the Court concluded that:
Belyea held his appointment from the corporation (of the City of Moncton) for
the purpose of administering the general law of the land, and that the wrong com-
plained of in this case was not committed by him while in the exercise of a duty of a
corporate nature which was imposed upon him by the direction or authority of the
corporation merely.5
A few years thereafter, the High Court of Australia considered a similar claim
arising from an illegal arrest by a police constable, and to evaluate the same issue
of the effect of the doctrine of respondeat superior as it related to the defendant
Government of Tasmania. Relying upon the prevailing law of agency, which
stated that the test was "whether the party sought to be made responsible retained
the power of controlling the act," 5 the Court in Enever v. The King determined:
Now, the powers of a constable, qud peace officer, whether conferred by common
or statute law, are exercised by him by virtue of his office, and cannot be exercised
on the responsibility of any person but himself. If he arrests on suspicion of felony,
the suspicion must be his suspicion, and must be reasonable to him. If he arrests in a
case in which the arrest may be made on view, the view must be his view, not
that of someone else. Moreover, his powers being conferred by law, they are definite
and limited, and there can be no suggestion of holding him out as a person pos-
sessed of greater authority than the law confers upon him. A constable, therefore,
52. 83 Mass. 172 (Sup. Jud. Ct., 1861) [Butick].
53. McCleave, supra note 49 at para. 2, citing Butrrick, ibid. at 174.
54. Ibid. at paras. 109-10.
55. [1906] 3 C.L.R. 969 at 977, Griffith C.J. (H.C.A.) [Eneverl.
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when acting as a peace officer, is not exercising a delegated authority, but an origi-
nal authority, and the general law of agency has no application.56
The concept introduced here of the constable's authority being "original" and
not delegated is important. His or her authority derives exclusively from the law
and not from governmental appointment or authority. Such laws as existed "were
intended merely to deal with the appointment and disciplinary control of con-
stables"" and implied no concept of agency or liability on the part of the Crown,
which had never existed." The question that remains, however, is the extent to
which this concept of independence applies in the present day. This is particularly
important to know with regard to matters that may not be exclusively law enforce-
ment functions and those situations where it is not clear to what degree the police
are conducting law enforcement. Historical examples of such problems will be
examined below.59
In 1955, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also identified the
unique authority of police constables. In Attorney-General for New South Wales
v. Perpetual Trustee Co.,"a the Judicial Committee observed that:
[A constable's] authority is original, not delegated, and is exercised at his own discre-
tion by virtue of his office: he is a ministerial officer exercising statutory rights inde-
pendently of contract. The essential difference is recognized in the fact that his rela-
tionship to the Government is not, in ordinary parlance, described as that of ser-
vant and master.61
As mentioned in Campbell," the Court's decision in Nichoon v. Haldimand-
Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police3 dealing with the issue of pro-
cedural fairness in relation to a probationary police constable held that "we are
dealing with the holder of a public office, engaged in duties connected with the
maintenance of public order and preservation of the peace, important values in
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. at 979.
58. Ibid.
59. See Part II(F), below.
60. [1955] A.C. 457 (P.C.) [Perpetual Trustee].
61. Ibid. at 489-90.
62. Campbell supra note 1 at para. 31.
63. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
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any society."" It went on to indicate that in the circumstances in the appeal, the
lower courts' construction of the applicable legislation results in "reducing the status
of the office of police constable to that involved in a master-servant relationship
merely because there had been less than eighteen months' service in the office.""
The clear implication here is that no police constable should be considered to be
in a master-servant relationship; they are all holders of public office. For the pur-
poses of analyzing the independence of police, the decision is constrained to its
facts, as this was an action for wrongful dismissal and, in the fashion of the other
cases, neglected to address in any manner the relationship between government
and police throughout the breadth of their duties.
The last case dealt with in any detail in Campbell is perhaps the best known
and most quoted case for the proposition that police are independent of govern-
ment direction: R. v. Metropolitan Police Comr., Ex parte Blackburn" was an
English appeals case written by the redoubtable Lord Denning in 1968. It is
claimed that this case "has had more influence over the realities of police govern-
ance in this country than any legislated mandate ever did."" Mr. Blackburn
brought an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the police to enforce gaming
laws which they were reluctant to do because of problems with prosecuting them.
As the matter directly addressed police discretion, the case most closely touches
that aspect of governance which is the object of this article. Prior to entering into
a review of the case, its principal dictum as expressed in the opinion of Lord
Denning will be stated. The decision relates to the position of the Commissioner
of the London Metropolitan Police, who is that force's chief of police. Lord
Denning held:
I have no hesitation ... in holding that, like every constable in the land, [the Commis-
sioner of the London Metropolitan Police] should be, and is, independent of the execu-
tive. He is not subject to the orders of the Secretary of State, save that under the Po-
lice Act 1964 the Secretary of State can call on him to give a report, or to retire in the
interests of efficiency. I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it
is of every chief constable, to enforce the law of the land. He must take steps so to
post his men that crimes may be detected; and that honest citizens may go about their
64. Ibid. at 322.
65. Ibid
66. Blackburn, supra note 30.
67. Philip C. Stenning, "Police and Politics: There and Back and There Again?" [Stenning,
"There and Back") in Macleod & Schneiderman, supra note 16, 209 at 214 (referring to
Canada).
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affairs in peace. He must decide whether or not suspected persons are to be prose-
cuted; and, if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is brought; but in all these
things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. No Minister of the
Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or
that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any po-
lice authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is an-
swerable to the law and to the law alone.68
Although the decision has considerable support in some corners, it has many
detractors. As Professor Stenning writes:
Despite the fact that one of the many critics of this statement has commented that
it deserves quotation in full "because seldom have so many errors of law and logic
been compressed into one paragraph,"69 Lord Denning's exposition of the doctrine
of police independence in the Blackburn case remains today the most oft-quoted
statement of the doctrine by its proponents in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, to the point that the doctrine is now not infrequently referred to as "the
Blackburn doctrine," and the Blackburn decision itself as the "police chiefs bible." If he
had had copyright over his statement, Lord Denning would have been able to retire a
lot sooner than he did.70
Denning's dictum appears to stand for a very wide and expansive proposition
of independence that leaves sparse room for accountability by the police to govern-
ment authorities. To be sure, Campbell does not appear to want to go so far,
although its true scope is somewhat unclear. At a minimum, Campbell stands for
the proposition that neither are the police protected by Crown immunity, nor is
the Crown liable for their misfeasance or malfeasance in relation to criminal
investigations.7 2 The court found that "the Commissioner [of the RCMP] is not
to be considered a servant or agent of the government while engaged in a criminal
investigation."" To deny civil liability of the police for misfeasance and yet claim
68. Blackburn, supra note 30 at 769.
69. Philip Stenning, "The Idea of the Political 'Independence' of the Police: International
Interpretations and Experiences" in Margaret E. Beare & Tonita Murray, eds., Police dr
Government Relations: Who's Calling the Shots? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)
183 at 198-99, citing Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance ofPolice (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1986) at 64.
70. Ibid
71. Ibid. at 199.
72. But see Hill v. Hamilton- Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129
(discussing important developments in tort liability regarding negligent investigations).
73. Campbell supra note I at para. 33. See Philip C. Stenning, "Someone to Watch over Me:
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Crown immunity for them in selected circumstances is illogical. As noted in
Campbell, "the Crown cannot have it both ways."7 6 The weakness of the judgment
in Campbell, perhaps attributable to the facts it was based on, is that it omits any
policy discussion of the ramifications of such findings in the context of very real
circumstances that arise every day in the interaction between government and the
police, except to concede that "for certain purposes the Commissioner of the
RCMP reports to the Solicitor General."" Of course, this is perfectly explicable
in our common law jurisprudence tradition since the courts should restrict their
findings to the facts and law arising in each case. The case does restrict itself to
criminal investigations and admits to the possibility "that in one or other of its
roles the RCMP could be acting in an agency relationship with the Crown.""
And, this criminal limitation is undoubtedly appropriate as explained by Stenning:
"Even if one were to assume that the [Blackburn] doctrine has some legitimate
basis in English legal history as applicable to English chief constables, it flies in
the face of some of the clearest language to the contrary in Canadian statues con-
cerning police governance."" Consequently, we must await future cases for judicial
guidance on the context where the "closer relationship"" exists.
This provides the history, policy, and jurisprudence dealing with police inde-
pendence that we require for understanding some of the background to the rela-
tionship of the MP and their commanders. The article can now examine those
same considerations as they relate to police governance. This will provide an expla-
nation of society's mechanisms by which the police are held accountable while still
Government Supervision of the RCMP" in W. Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: The
APECAffair (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000) 87 at 87-92, 95
[Stenning, "Someone to Watch"] (for a discussion of the problems of identifying what is
"law enforcement." This pertains to what the Court may mean by restricting itself to
"criminal investigation").
74. Campbell, ibid. at para. 35.
75. Ibid. at para. 33. See also Public Safety Act, supra note 4 4 , s. 34(1)(s). As per the Act, the
current Minister responsible for the RCMP is the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness.
76. Ibid at para. 29. See also ibid. at para. 28 (providing a brief description of the RCMP's
"myriad of functions apart from the investigation of crime" wherein they may be in a "closer
relationship to the Crown").
77. Stenning, "There and Back," supra note 67 at 215.
78. Campbell, supra note I at para. 28.
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being independent. These mechanisms will show the practical tools that may be
appropriate for the governance of the MP in Canada today.
D. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
The theories and practices of police governance generally address two interrelated
but distinct forms of governance. The first is the provision of policy guidance and
task prioritization through the appropriate minister or through a police services
board which is responsible to that minister." The police are commonly responsible
to inform their respective minister or board of important issues as they arise. This
is the form of governance that will be studied in this article. For convenience, the
term "oversight" will be used in this article to describe it."
The other form of governance is that which is generally provided in response
to complaints about the police. This form of expost facto governance aims to ad-
dress alleged aberrations in the use of police authority. It can, and indeed probably
should, tie back into the first form of governance through its recommendations.
Often it will be able to contribute to decisions concerning policies, equipment,
training, and so on. The recent controversy in Canadian policing concerning the
use of Taser weapons is a good example of this issue. Numerous complaints com-
missions or review panels8 1 exist with varying degrees of authority to compel
attendance, provide remedies to complainants, and change police policies and
procedures. This form of governance is generally referred to as "review."8 2 Again,
79. There can be numerous variations of this construct, but it is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss them all. These two forms are the most common. The terms "police commissions
and "police service boards," or minor variations of them, are used rather interchangeably. For
simplicity, all will be referred to as police service boards hereafter.
80. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, Accountability and Transparency: Background Paper (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2006) at 15-17 [Arar, Background Paper].
81. As with police service boards, complaints commissions frequently go by different names (e.g.
Ontario Civilian Police Commission, Ontario's newly established Independent Police
Review Office, the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, and the Military Police Complaints Commission).
82. See Arar, Background Paper, supra note 80 at 15-17. The Canadian Forces has two formal
review mechanisms to oversee complaints relating to MP. Internal review is provided by the
Military Police Credentials Review Board. Independent civilian review is provided by the
Military Police Complaints Commission. Both the Credentials Board and the Complaints
Commission are established pursuant to the National Defence Act, supra note 10, Part IV-
Complaints About or By Military Police.
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this article is restricted to the analysis of the "oversight" form of governance, as
it applies to Canadian policing generally and as it should apply to the MP.
Formal police oversight structures have existed in various forms since at least
the mid-nineteenth century, although these were restricted to municipal police
forces. Provincial police commissions, however, date only from the 1960s." The
two main reasons for the existence of both provincial commissions and municipal
police services boards are (a) the provision of regulation which goes beyond that
which can be reasonably provided by other means of regulation such as the courts,
police discipline structures, or human rights tribunals; and (b) the provision of
"important administrative functions which support the delivery-of police services.""
The following section examines police services boards in more detail as an impor-
tant means in Canada to govern police.
E. POLICE SERVICES BOARDS
Historically, governance responsibilities rested with ministers. Over recent dec-
ades, however, governance responsibilities have been devolved to municipal
police services boards, although in some cases those responsibilities have been
retaken by ministers." Even where police service boards operate, ministers continue
to hold supervisory responsibilities." The following will discuss general principles
that animate many of the various federal and provincial legislations, accepting
the numerous variations between jurisdictions.
The development of police services boards likely started primarily to insulate
police forces from direct influence of an undue nature by elected officials. That is,
in many ways the boards assist both police and government to achieve some of the
ideals discussed above regarding accountability and independence. The Court of
Appeal for Saskatchewan explained that it was "to place the chief of police, the
officers and the constables of the force in a position where they are removed from
the influence of persons who may attempt to interfere with the due performance
of police duties."' The Law Commission of Canada explained:
83. Paul Ceyssens, LegalAspects ofPolicing, vol. 1, looseleaf (Saltspring Island: Earlscourt Legal
Press, 1994) at para. 4.2(a).
84. Ibid. at para. 4.1.
85. Ibid.
86. See e.g. Police Services Act, supra note 3, s. 3(2).
87. Bruton v. Regina City Policemen 'sAssociation, Local No. 155, [19451 D.L.R. 437 at 448 (Sask.
CA). For a more fulsome discussion of this issue, see also Ceyssens, supra note 83 at para. 4 .3(a).
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Since the mid-19"' century, police governance institutions at the regional and munici-
pal level (known ... more recently as police services boards) were established with the
specific intention of insulating the police from direct governance by elected municipal
politicians, and guaranteeing a measure of political independence for police services in
the performance of their duties. The idea has been to further remove the police from
direct political control by ensuring that these independent bodies, rather than
elected politicians, provide policy direction and approve police budgets.88
Board members are appointed, not elected. The Ontario scheme provides
various boards of different size depending upon the size of the community that the
respective police force is serving. 9 Judges, justices of the peace, police officers, and
criminal defence counsel are excluded from membership," whereas required mem-
bers include the head of the municipal council or a delegate, another council mem-
ber, council appointed citizen(s), and provincial appointees, depending upon the
board size.91 Board members are bound by regulation to a code of conduct which
prescribes, in part:
1. Board members shall attend and actively participate in all board meetings.
2. Board members shall not interfere with the police force's operational decisions
and responsibilities or with the day-to-day operation of the police force, in-
cluding the recruitment and promotion of police officers.
3. Board members shall undergo any training that may be provided or required
for them by the Solicitor General.
4. Board members shall keep confidential any information disclosed or dis-
cussed at a meeting of the board, or part of a meeting of the board, that was
closed to the public.
5. No board member shall purport to speak on behalf of the board unless he or
she is authorized by the board to do so.9 2
88. Ceyssens, ibid., citing Law Commission of Canada, In Search ofSecurity: The Future of
Policing in Canada (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) at 85.
But see Lorne Sossin, "The Oversight of Executive-Police Relations in Canada: 'The
Constitution, the Courts, Administrative Processes, and Democratic Governance"' in Beare
& Murray, supra note 69, 96 at 106-07. Sossin acknowledges these ideals, yet provides a
practical example of its failure when the Toronto Police Services Board became dysfunctional
in 2004.
89. Police Services Act, supra note 3, s. 27.
90. Ibid., s. 27(13).
91. Ibid., ss. 27(4)-(9).
92. Members of Police Services Boards-Code of Conduct, 0. Reg. 421/97, ss. 1-5.
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Presently, the alternative scheme of governance by direction from the respon-
sible minister is restricted in Canada to the RCMP" and the Ontario Provincial
Police (OPP),14 although in Ontario's case, the OPP are still subject to oversight
and direction by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission." The Commission,
however, does not have a policy-making role; rather, it generally may inquire into
the conduct of police services boards and police forces. Duties are not prescribed
for the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, who is responsible
for the RCMP, although they are for the Minister of Community Safety and
Correctional Services in the case of the OPP.96 However, these duties apply to all
police forces in Ontario including the OPP. Because of the general nature of the
legislation in each case, few lessons can be drawn from the relationships that would
add to the discussion of governance of the MP in any meaningful way. None-
theless, the principles and structures of police services boards appear to provide
a useful framework for consideration in the military context.
The advantage of boards is that they have the potential to develop expertise
that ministers and their staff would never be able to acquire. Further, they can
more effectively address the local concerns of those being served by police forces.
Finally, the benefit of providing more binding and meaningful policies adapted
to local circumstances while still reflecting concerns and priorities at the provincial
levels can aid in achieving a level of commonality amongst communities which
residents can rely upon, while reflecting parochial priorities.97 Police boards, how-
ever, are not a panacea for the ailments which independence seeks to overcome.
Nonetheless, they provide a promising governance structure which may be usefully
applied to address the inherent challenges of military commanders having direct
command over the MP. Although there are few recorded incidents in the Canadian
Forces where such challenges caused problems, civil law examples abound.
93. RCMP Act, supra note 3, s. 5.
94. Police Services Act, supra note 3, s. 17(2).
95. Ibid, s. 22.
96. Ibid., s. 3(2).
97. See also Kent Roach, "The Overview: Four Models of Police-Government Relations" in
Beare & Murray, supra note 69, 16 at 67-69.
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F. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENCE
In 1959, Commissioner Nicholson of the RCMP resigned in protest of the federal
government's refusal to follow his advice to send additional RCMP officers to sup-
port the Government of Newfoundland as it requested." In the Commissioner's
view, there was improper interference by the federal government with police
business." Newfoundland had decided to decertify an American logging industry
union that was involved in a protracted and significant strike, and wanted to replace
it with one that the Premier himself was attempting to organize. The RCMP were
the provincial police outside of St. John's and pursuant to their contract the provin-
cial Attorney-General could request additional forces which Canada was obliged to
send if circumstances permitted. The Commissioner assessed that at least fifty
officers could be spared and had them on standby in Moncton. The federal gov-
ernment declined to send them, however, assessing the matter as politically-
motivated union bashing by the Newfoundland government of which the fed-
eral government wanted no part.
As a result, the Commissioner resigned. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Minis-
ter tabled an amendment to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,oo changing
the operative wording in section 5 relating to the relationship between the Minister
and the Commissioner. It now reads as follows:
The Governor in Council may appoint an officer to be known as the Commis-
sioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who, under the direction of the Minis-
ter, has the control and management of the force and all matters connected
therewith.0 1
The former relevant section in place until that time read "under the Minis-
ter."102 While this amendment clearly indicated the government's intent to control
the police as it saw fit, practices changed only a decade later.
The role of the government led by Prime Minister Trudeau in directing
policing operations also raised considerable concern during the 1970 Front de
Liberation du Qudbec uprising, although "perhaps [we] will never know for sure to
98. See Stenning, "Someone to Watch," supra note 73 at 87-92.
99. Ibid. at 89, 92.
100. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, S.C. 1959, c. 54, s. 5.
101. Ibid. [emphasis added].
102. Stenning, "Someone to Watch," supra note 73, citing the former Royal Canadian Mounted
PoliceAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 241, s. 10(1).
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what extent, if at all, political direction of policing decisions occurred."'as Accusa-
tions that the government was directly involved ensued in the following years as the
RCMP, in executing their former mandate as a security service, engaged in "pat-
ently illegal activities in their efforts to gain intelligence about, and thwart the ef-
forts of, separatists in Quebec."' 4 In stark contrast to the Nicholson Incident,
when questioned about the government's knowledge of those police operations,
Prime Minister Trudeau stated:
[T]he policy of this government ... has been that they-indeed, the politicians
who happen to form the government-should be kept in ignorance of the day-to-
day operations of the police force and even of the security force. ... [I]t is not a matter
of pleading ignorance as an excuse. It is a matter of stating, as a principle, that the par-
ticular minister of the day should not have a right to know what the police are con-
stantly doing ... [or] in the way in which they are doing it ... [T]he protections we
have against abuse are not with the government, they are with the courts.10 5
Prime Minister Trudeau focused on accountability for misdeeds or illegal
activity through the courts after the fact. This is certainly an important aspect of
accountability and governance, but he perhaps conveniently omitted to discuss
the role of government in giving operational or policy direction to the forces that
resulted in their illegal activity. It does appear that his government was quite in-
volved in at least prioritizing, inter alia, police efforts. As the Minister of External
Affairs noted, the government "felt that the RCMP was directing too much of its
attention on Communists to the detriment of the real threat in Canada from sepa-
ratists." Indeed, the Commissioner of the RCMP specifically requested "clear
direction" from the government for such activity.'0 6
These two incidents highlight the tensions that can arise in policing operations
between the executive and the chief of police. In the Nicholson Incident, the gov-
ernment was not about to allow an independent police force to create an untenable
political problem. On the other hand, Prime Minister Trudeau appears to have
found the hands-off approach to policing, as he publicly expressed it, as perhaps
a convenient means of achieving political goals without being held accountable.
The RCMP were left out to dry despite following the government's wishes. Surely,
there is middle ground to find in this crucial relationship.
103. Ibid at 99.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. at 99-100.
106. Ibid. at 100.
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In contrast to Trudeau's stance, when looking into the allegations of wrong-
doing by the RCMP Security Service, the McDonald Commission.. made the
following observations about police independence and governmental involvement:
3. We take it to be axiomatic that in a democratic state the police must never be
allowed to become a law unto themselves. Just as our form of Constitution dic-
tates that the armed forces must be subject to civilian control, so too must
police forces operate in obedience to governments... os
4. The concept of independence for peace officers in executing their duties has been
elevated to a position of paramountcy in defining the role and functions of the
RMCP. ... We believe, on the contrary, that the peace officer duties of the
RCMP should qualify, but not dictate, the essential nature of those rela-
tionships.o
10 9
19. ... [T]he Minister should have no right of direction with respect to the exercise
by the RCMP of the powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution. To that
extent, and that extent only should the English doctrine expounded in Ex Parte
Blackburn be made applicable to the RCMP... [However], the Minister should
have the right to be, and should insist on being, informed ofany operational matter,
even one involving an individual case, if it raises an important question ofpublic
policy. In such cases he may give guidance to the Commissioner and express to the
Commissioner the government's view o the matter, but he should have no power
to give direction to the Commissioner.
This provides some of the clearest direction about government-police relations.
While acknowledging the importance for the police to be able to investigate
individual criminal matters under conditions of their choosing, there is clear
acknowledgement that, unlike Blackburn, the police are responsible to more than
just the law itself and their own conscience. The McDonald Commission provides
the key as being governmental involvement in matters where "it raises an impor-
tant question of public policy."" However, even this important theme of keeping
the government informed omits the other equally salient question of the proper
107. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, Second Report, Freedom and Security Under the Law, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1981) [McDonald Commission].
108. Ibid. at 1005.
109. Ibid at 1006.
110. Ibid. at 1013 [emphasis added].
111. Ibid.
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means of prioritizing policing activities, since the Commission seems to restrict
itself to ongoing investigations.1 1 2
The debacle arising from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meetings of November 1997 perhaps best illustrates the grey areas of governmental
interaction with police. The facts are very helpful in illustrating what could be
termed "political interference," and yet also illustrate those areas where political
involvement in police operations may be quite appropriate. Canada hosted the
annual high-level meeting of APEC leaders from 19 to 25 November 1997 in
Vancouver, and the RCMP were responsible for security. The security concerns
included expected student protests against some of the foreign governments
represented at the meetings on the final day at the University of British Columbia
(UBC). There were a number of buildings and roadways on the university campus
granted by licence to the Government for the purposes of the conference.' In spite
of the RCMP's security assessment, "[t]he RCMP enlarge[d] the perimeter of a
fenced area that they had deemed necessary for security purposes at UBC in order
to accommodate [the Prime Minister's] 'specific wish that this is a retreat and lead-
ers should not be distracted by demos, etc.'"' This was the result of political
considerations to maintain the dignity of the event, as well as its security. The
political considerations dealing with dignity which affected the security plan-
ning were discussed in detail in the APEC Report,"' but were not found to be
inappropriate:
Although the Canadian government did not guarantee that President Suharto
would not be embarrassed, it is my view that in appropriate circumstances the federal
government and the RCMP may be justified in taking limited steps to ensure that
112. See also Ontario, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry: Investigation and Findings, vol. 1 at 676-77
[Ipperwash Inquiry]. The Commissioner, Justice Sidney B. Linden, seems equivocal about the
appropriate involvement of government and the proper police response to any such
involvement.
113. Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, APEC-Commission Inteirm Report
(2001) at para. 6.2, online: <https://www.cpc-cpp.gc.ca/prr/rep/phr/apec/APEC-intR-index-
eng.aspx> [APECReport].
114. ."Chronology of Events" in W. Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: TheAPECAffair (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2000) xii at xiii (citing the notes of RCMP Superintendent
Wayne May from 27 August 1997).
115. APEC Report, supra note 113 at para. 9.
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visiting heads of state are not subject to certain types of embarrassment or affronts to
their dignity.116
The issue of the moment, then, is the extent to which such instruction is
consistent with lawful direction by a government to its police. With this review,
we can now appreciate the issues that can arise in government-police relations and
the importance of recognizing the necessity not only of the police requirement for
independence, but also that government has legitimate interests which may neces-
sitate some involvement in police operations.
Using the events at APEC as a factual basis upon which to examine the issue,
important insights may be found. It was clearly within the mandate of the RCMP
in that case to establish and enforce a security perimeter for the protection of those
Internationally Protected Persons under their charge.' Further, their mandate
included the protection of all persons who may have been or actually were subject
to attack or other criminal offences, although in this latter case they may have
used their discretion as to the manner in which it was addressed. What, then, is the
mandate of Canadian police services to enforce matters beyond lawful necessity,
but which, in and of themselves, are legitimate political goals? In this case,
their mandate was the broadening of the security perimeter from what the
RCMP assessed as necessary for security purposes, to what the government as-
sessed as necessary for political purposes."'
It is proposed that as there was no legitimate law enforcement requirement
here to expand the perimeter, it was for the government-requestor to provide
the lawful basis to the police who they directed to enforce such extended
116. Ibid at paras. 9.4, 9.7.
117. See also R. v. Knowlton, [1974] S.C.R. 443 [Knowlton]; Tremblay c. Quibec (Procureur
gindral), [2001] J.Q. no. 1504 (Sup. Ct.). Knowlton dealt with an accused who unlawfully
and wilfully obstructed a peace officer who was protecting Premier Kosygin of the United
Soviet Socialist Republic. The accused attempted to take pictures of the Premier in a
restricted area deemed necessary by the police for the Premier's protection. In Tremblay, the
accused unsuccessfully sought a permanent injunction against the police security forces .
protecting certain international dignitaries at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec
City in 2001. The police refused him permission to enter into a restricted area for the purposes
of lawfully protesting. In both cases, the restricted areas were otherwise public spaces.
118. See APECReport, supra note 113 at para. 13.2.2. APEC Commissioner Justice Hughes
found no evidence that the security perimeter was larger than necessary. However, for the
purpose of discussion, it will be assumed that the perimeter was expanded beyond what the
RCMP assessed as necessary to satisfy its security requirements.
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requirements."' For example, where a conference such as that of APEC occurs on
private property, perhaps provincial trespass legislation can be relied upon.
Similarly, military commanders can control entry to their bases through the
Defence Controlled Access Area Regulations"o to similar effect, should a conference
be held on a military base. Perhaps other government property may be protected
by similar regulations. What would be illegitimate would be for the police to use
force, including their powers of arrest, detention, and restrictive controls for any
purpose that is not founded in law. Some of Commissioner Hughes's most useful
recommendations deal directly with this:
* When the RCMP are performing law enforcement functions (investigation,
arrest and prosecution) they are entirely independent of the federal govern-
ment and answerable only to the law.
* When the RCMP are performing their other functions, they are not entirely
independent but are accountable to the federal government through the Solicitor
General of Canada or such other branch of government as Parliament may
authorize.
* In all situations, the RCMP are accountable to the law and the courts. Even
when performing functions that are subject to government direction, officers
are required by the RCMP Act to respect and uphold the law at all times.
* The RCMP are solely responsible for weighing security requirements against
the Charter rights of citizens. Their conduct will violate the Charter if they give
inadequate weight to Charter rights. The fact that they may have been follow-
ing the directions of political masters will be no defence if they fail to do that.
* An RCMP member acts inappropriately if he or she submits to government
direction that is contrary to law. Not even the Solicitor General may direct
the RCMP to unjustifiably infringe Charter rights, as such directions would
be unlawful. 121
It therefore appears patent that the issue of independence and governance
go hand in hand. Both are qualified, neither takes precedence over the other, and
each is essential. Where the executive gives direction to the police in furtherance
of its legitimate governing role, such as instructing them to act beyond what they
assess is required for law enforcement purposes, it should do so in a manner that
119. See Roach, supra note 97 at 55 (suggesting in his "Full Police Independence" model that
police have their own lawyers to advise them on such issues). This raises the related issue,
then, of the requirement for police to have their own lawyers to advise them independently
of government in such circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this article, however, to
address this issue.
120. S.O.R./86-957, made pursuant to National Defence Act, supra note 10, s. 12(1).
121. APEC Report, supra note 113 at para. 10.4.
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is readily reviewable through the provision of written instructions and the bases
in law for such action. Police services boards may do this on behalf of the execu-
tive. They can act as the link between necessary police independence and the
provision of lawful executive direction.
It is proposed that police services boards are uniquely positioned to provide
ascertainable and reviewable executive direction to police through their written
directions to them. They ensure the accountability of the police through a review
of police actions, recommendations, and reports. Further, boards have the advan-
tage of being able to develop expertise in police governance that a minister will
ordinarily lack. The chief of police is responsible to the board to ensure that the
necessary law enforcement independence is respected, although the chiefs position
on any such matter is itself reviewable by the board, the executive, and the courts.
Similarly, the police would be able to point to the board's directions in reliance
for their activities of a non-law enforcement type. They would always be account-
able to the board through their reports and advice, including those instances where
they decline executive direction. This latter case could only arise, it is suggested,
where the board's direction impinges upon their necessary independence in a law
enforcement situation, or where the police must weigh the effect of Charte22
issues related to such direction, or the lawfulness of the direction.123 In the APEC
case, for example, it was likely reasonable to expand the perimeter to satisfy gov-
ernment requirements as long as there was a lawful basis to control that extra land
beyond that which was needed for the protection of the dignitaries. However, their
confiscation of protest signs was improper since it infringed the protestors' right
to free speech. The signs could not be viewed as unlawful since there was no crimi-
nal threat to the dignitaries by their use, and there was no legitimate executive
function which could otherwise justify their removal."'
In spite of this history, considerable debate continues in Canada concern-
ing the relationship between government and police, which in turn has led to
further detailed analyses of the issue of police governance.125 We will continue
122. Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
123. See APEC Report, supra note 113 at para. 10.4.
124. See e.g. ibid at paras. 13-30.
125. Several public inquiries from both the federal and provincial levels of government have been
struck, addressing the interrelationship of government and police. The more important and
relevant ones that are studied here include the McDonald Commission, Somalia Inquiry, and
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our examination of the issues with a brief review of some of the current theoreti-
cal governance models. These models were presented at a symposium held in
support of Ontario's Ipperwash Inquiryl 26 into the killing of Dudley George by
the OPP during a protest in 1995 at the Kettle and Stony Point First Nations
on Lake Huron. A key part of the Inquiry's mandate was to investigate police and
government relations. 127
G. MODELS OF OVERSIGHT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Professor Kent Roach provides a comprehensive study of four models of police
governance.128 His "[mlodels provide a convenient means of highlighting different
policy options and the value choices and assumptions implicit in the choice of those
policies."129 They help to provide a basis for comprehensive debates about alter-
natives by grounding discussion in somewhat fixed constructs for comparative
purposes. They need not be limiting as they tend to spawn new models to address
identified weaknesses and unique situations as will be studied here with the MP.a'
Roach's first model... is that of full police independence founded on the
Blackburn doctrine, which in his view proposes police autonomy for law enforce-
ment and deployment purposes. Supporters of this model would find comfort in
government statements holding that the government has no role in day-to-day
police operations and indeed should be kept uninformed of them.132 He also sug-
gests that proponents of this model are likely cynical of the reliability and integrity
of elected officials, who they see to be incapable of directing police without
partisan motives.
His second model is titled "Quasi-Judicial or Core Police Independ-
ence."" Based on the Campbell case, the model explains a relationship exempt
of any executive direction involving "core law enforcement functions" such as
the APEC Inquiry.
126. Ipperwash Inquiry, supra note 112. For more information about the symposium, see
"Foreword" in Beare & Murray, supra note 69 at ix-x.
127. Beare & Murray, ibid. at ix.
128. Roach, supra note 97.
129. Ibid. at 54.
130. Ibid. at 54-55.
131. Ibid. at 55-57.
132. See e.g. Prime Minister Trudeau's statement at 26, above.
133. Roach, supra note 97 at 57-59.
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the investigation and laying of charges. It suggests a construct based on the rule
of law which seeks to ensure that there is no interference in applying the law in
an equitable manner to all, irrespective of one's position in society. Acknowl-
edging some interaction between the parties, it would see a healthy balance
when seeking information of police while avoiding improprieties. Full confi-
dence in the police is assumed in criminal matters where prosecutors and courts
act as checks, acknowledging, however, the lack of systemic review mechanisms
when police decline to lay charges.
The third model, "Democratic Policing,"" is similar to-but more dynamic
than-the core policing independence model. It is based on the recommendations
of the McDonald Commission, which accepts that not only can ministers be in-
formed, but that they must be informed because they have the responsibility to act
in exigent circumstances where significant political issues arise. It emphasizes the
classic ideal of ministerial responsibility in our parliamentary system, which could
also be realized by police services boards seeking to represent the broader com-
munity's interest in providing necessary direction to police.
Roach's fourth model is called "Governmental Policing."135 This presents an
opposite theme to his first model of policing, which seeks full police independence.
Skepticism is not directed towards the governing powers, but the likelihood that
police independence will allow them to become a law unto their own. The model
would support close involvement of political staff and police such as has been
developing between, for example, the Prime Minister's Office and the Commis-
sioner of the RCMP, as well as the effect of the recent anti-terrorism laws and the
increasing influence of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
Both of these developments have been at the expense of the ministerial authority
of the former Solicitor-General.' This model centralizes policing operations
along with many other political functions and therefore shows less confidence
in the expertise and abilities of police in the modern complex world.
Professor Lorne Sossin provides another, perhaps less structured, model
than those of Roach."' He seeks to answer the following questions: "[W]hat are
the mechanisms which constrain and define executive accountability and police
134. Ibid. at 59-62.
135. Ibid. at 62-64.
136. Ibid. at 63.
137. Sossin, supra note 88.
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oversight in Canada ... [and] can the need for the police to remain apolitical and
autonomous be reconciled with mechanisms of governance and accountability?"'
He then sets out to address these two competing demands with an "apolitical and
autonomous" model of relationship.' Sossin's fundamental concern is that there
is no "overarching vision and coherence" to oversight in the literature, with most
commentators identifying themselves as either pro-police or anti-police; Sossin
finds these identifications inhibit constructive dialogue. Further, an artificial
construct of "police policy" and "police operations" pervades the discussion, which
he finds "is maintained not because it accords with a readily identifiable boundary,
but rather because we have yet to discover any other way of distinguishing legiti-
mate government interests from illegitimate ones.""' He defines "apolitical" as
"an orientation of detachment" from the political process, whereas "autonomous"
relates "to a set of administrative practices, arrangements, and structures that
constitute a functional separation from the government.""'
Sossin's model proposes a culture of interest in, and sensitivity to, political
concerns while eschewing its influence on fundamental policing decisions. Auton-
omy does not mean independence since, as Sossin finds is reflected in policing
history in Canada and extant legislation, the police should not be independent
of government control. High levels of police professionalism involving strong in-
ternal controls, "intra-executive" review, as well as external oversight, ensures
"functional autonomy and the highest standards of professionalism.""l 2 Sossin
explores the problem with the policy/operational dichotomy that is in vogue, and
explains that although it is certainly clear in some circumstances, it is much less
so in others, Where executive decisions are taken that affect policing operations,
it is essential that clear written records explain the issue."' Sossin suggests various
mechanisms to realize his model, central to which is the role of all three branches
of government in providing fulsome and vigorous oversight.
138. Ibid. at 96.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid. at 99.
141. Ibid. at 101.
142. Ibid. at 102.
143. Ibid. at 123-24.
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Continuing the theme that the policy/operational dichotomy has inherent
weaknesses, Professor Margaret Beare proposed a pragmatic analysis.'" She noted
that government-police relations are much more integrated and subtle than com-
mentators might have you believe. Problems only come to light when there are
crises, and so this subtle, pervasive, and ongoing interaction generally goes unno-
ticed. She quotes Robert Reiner to illustrate the point: "Like riding a bike, polic-
ing is the sort of activity that is thought about mainly when the wheel comes off.
When things are running smoothly it tends to be a socially invisible, undis-
cussed routine."' 45
As other authois have pointed out, for all the independence and autonomy
that police will espouse as being essential to the proper execution of their duties
and maintenance of professionalism, they commonly use political means to achieve
their interests through, for example, the promotion or support of political poli-
cies, politicians, or parties.'" Similarly, one only needs a cursory knowledge of
North American politics to see the depth to which politicians rely on policing
for their own interests, such as promoting policies of "getting tough on crime,"
"war on drugs," youth violence, and so on. To understand the dynamics of the
relationship, all aspects need to be acknowledged and the more it is examined,
the weaker and more inconsistent in practice are concepts of independence and
autonomy. Beare gives a very interesting overview of policing in politically height-
ened conditions in Canada that provides helpful context to her argument4 7 and
illustrates the developing international influences on policing. Although police
may move to standardize techniques and equipment with foreign services, there
is often international political pressure to standardize laws and ensure coop-
eration, all of which weakens the argument for independence."'
144. Margaret E. Beare, "Steeped in Politics: The Ongoing History of Politics in Policing" [Beare,
"Steeped in Politics"] in Beare & Murray, supra note 69, 313.
145. Ibid. at 316, citing Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000) at 9.
146. Ibid. (relying therein on Orwin Marenin and Gerry Woods). See also ibid at 350-53.
147. Ibid. at 324-33.-
148. Ibid at 360-62.
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H. SUMMARY
In spite of much of the rhetoric-from Lord Denning, chiefs of police, or po-
lice unions-it is clear that the concept of police independence needs to be ap-
proached carefully and treated in an intelligent and pragmatic fashion. There is
seldom, if ever, justification for government to intervene in the methods of po-
lice investigations or their charge-laying discretion. However, from a govern-
ance perspective, it is arguable that the executive and military commanders
need to know about those policing activities that affect their own obligations.
The devil will be in the details as to how that is accomplished, but Roach's
models help us conceive the vital issues to be addressed and the outcome of
different scenarios. Sossin, too, helpfully illustrates the professional approach,
which he recommends should be taken under the rubric of police being "apoliti-
cal and autonomous" in their relationship with government, while Beare prag-
matically identifies the interconnectedness of the relationship as opposed to its
independence. Indeed, Beare finds that government and police regularly demon-
strate their mutual dependence. Many of the issues will not be readily applicable
in the military concept because of fundamental structural differences. Nonethe-
less, these models and theories need to be examined carefully, as they provide
important guidance and illustrate inevitable weaknesses that must be taken into
account. In any event, those governance structures must be balanced with the
courts' perceptions of the importance of police independence. The trick now is
to extrapolate those indicia of society's standards and apply them reasonably and
fairly to the military context. Remember that the role of the MP is significantly
different than that of other police services. To be effective, the standards must
be applied mutatis mutandis, thereby giving due consideration to necessary bona
fide requirements of the Canadian Forces.
Part III, below, will examine where the Canadian Forces is today in its polic-
ing. We will continue its story from the Somalia Inquiry and examine related
and influential reports which resound in its organization today. From this under-
standing, we will be positioned to propose a way ahead that, it is suggested, will
best provide an accountable and efficient MP force governance structure for the
Forces that adequately reflects Canadian standards.
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III. ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE OF MILITARY POLICE
At the outset, it was proposed that the command and control arrangements of
MP be examined with a view to comparing them to standards of civilian policing
governance in Canada. Acknowledging the important differences in the roles,
priorities, and communities served, the article starts from an understanding that
accountability and oversight of the MP should be comparable in quality if not in
form to other police forces, save for bona fide military requirements.
A number of issues arise as we review the jurisprudence and literature. In-
dependence of the police from government interference has been a theme
throughout the history of the common law constable, but the scope and texture
of that concept is less clear. At one extreme is the Blackburn doctrine, which
appears to insist that the constable. "is not the servant of anyone, save of the law
itself."'" The decisions and theories since that time have tried to provide greater
context to the position. Importantly, Campbell confirms the concept of "origi-
nal authority" as being a key component of independence."' This suggests the
existence of inherent powers in policing which may not be infringed by other
authority."' If that is correct, then military command is excluded from interfer-
ence with police discretion, at least to the degree that it relates to law enforce-
ment. This becomes crucial in deciding who commands MP, and the answer
seems obvious: if police have "original authority," then only they may decide on
its application. It appears the police may only be commanded by police, al-
though there is a continuing relationship, accountability, and responsiveness to
the executive for non-law enforcement matters.
On the other hand, there is a danger in overstating the concept of police in-
dependence as the literature explains. Certainly, there must be a relationship of
accountability to those government agencies to which police are responsible. In
the military sense, this means that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal must be
responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff who is the Canadian Forces's senior
commander. This accountability includes executing those lawful orders which
fulfil the military mandate and otherwise do not interfere with law enforcement.
149. Blackburn, supra note 30 at 769.
150. Campbell, supra note 1.
151. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. "inherent powers."
38 (2010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The subtleties and complexities of this relationship have been observed by
Beare and Sossin.' 52
There are two main models of accountability within the "oversight" form of
governance: ministerial oversight, and that of police services boards.'" Recall that
the paramilitary model of policing generally relies on a direct relationship be-
tween the respective chief of police and minister, as is the case with the RCMP"
and OPP, whereas municipal police forces are generally governed by police services
boards. The former, it was suggested, traditionally had a role of dominion to
enforce the Crown's presence whereas the latter was representative of locals pro-
tecting themselves and consequently being responsive primarily to their commu-
nity. But where do the MP fit in? It might appear at first instance that in the Forces,
the MP being a force of the Crown would have the role of dominion in the fashion
of the RCMP, OPP, et cetera. But this may not be sustainable where the role of
MP is that of supporting commanders in keeping discipline of their troops, whereas
a force like the North West Mounted Police in the nineteenth century enforced
colonial dominion over the Aboriginal peoples.
Whether paradigms of municipal constable or paramilitary forces are at all
helpful, then, is questionable. Perhaps a more pragmatic view of the form of gov-
ernance which would best be workable should be the starting point. Kent Roach's
analyses are of assistance in that they suggest that before we decide how we want
to effect governance, we need to decide what purpose we want it to serve.' 55 It
appears that his "full independence" and "government policing" models may be
perhaps difficult to implement in the military context. The duties of MP primar-
ily involve support to commanders in the exercise of their legitimate mandates,
152. See above at 33-35 for a discussion of their positions.
153. See Part II(D), above, for a discussion of the two forms of police governance, being
"oversight" and "review."
154. See e.g. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 2006). Chaired by the Right Honourable Dennis
O'Connor, the Commissioner's report provides a discussion of the relative merits of
oversight structures as they relate to the national security mandate of the RCMP.
155. See 32-33, above, for a review of Roach's arguments.
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which requires both close coordination and responsiveness to the commanders'
needs. Thus, neither the fully independent model nor the detailed control by
government" (in this case by commanders) is pragmatic or efficient. The high
level of specialization and technical knowledge of police is more efficiently left to
them, with a coordinating and prioritizing role left to the commanders in situ.
Roach's other two models, "quasi-judicial or core police independence"
and "democratic policing," may have a more realistic chance of implementa-
tion. The intent here is not to decide which model or combination of models
might be most appropriate, but to highlight those which could effectively provide
acceptable governance and be readily adapted to the military context. It is sug-
gested that the latter two fit the bill since they appear to be more amenable to the
military hierarchy and the common give and take in command structures. How-
ever, it may be that no model is sufficient. Sossin's proposal of a relationship
where the police are "apolitical and autonomous" can certainly have grounding
in the Forces context. In their role of supporting commanders, MP should
embrace their legitimate military tasks except to the extent that those tasks may
impinge on their ability to effectively execute their law enforcement duties.
Their responsibility should be to provide technical and other professional polic-
ing advice to give best effect to those tasks and to expose the impact those tasks
will have on other policing duties that may be affected.
Keeping these issues in mind, we will now step back to examine the recent de-
velopment of the MP in the Canadian Forces. This review will help us understand
how the MP arrived at their current command arrangements prior to our analysis
of how they might change to meet modern standards of police governance.
A. THE SOMALIA AFFAIR, 1993
Somalia had fallen into anarchy after the overthrow of its president in 1991, and in
short time a humanitarian crisis developed because of widespread famine, which
was exacerbated by the fighting between various outlaw militia gangs. The Cana-
dian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was deployed in late 1992 as part of a
United Nations-sanctioned peace enforcement operation' They made their
base camp near the town of Belet Huen, whose people were severely affected by
the crisis. Because of the large military encampment and its relative wealth of
156. Somalia Inquiry, supra note 4. See chapters eleven and twelve for the situation at the time in
Somalia, including the development and approval of the political and military plans.
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stores, locals commonly broke into the camp to steal goods. The Canadian
commanders were incapable of stopping the pilfering that was seriously affecting
operations and they incrementally adopted more and more stringent security
measures. Illegal orders were eventually issued to abuse the pilferers who were
caught in the camp in an attempt to stop them. In at least one case, this re-
sulted in a Somali being captured, tortured, and killed.
Three important reports in relation to the MP were issued as a result of the
events in Somalia. Their principal recommendations are briefly addressed here.
The Somalia Inquiry, which examined this incident and the deployment of the
Canadian Forces to Somalia, was wide-ranging.' A significant part related to the
military justice system, including the role and powers of the MP and their relation-
ship with commanders. The Inquiry felt that the command structure inhibited
the MP in their ability to effectively and independently investigate suspected
crimes, including those involving the commanders themselves. This problem
became acute when two senior officers, including the Commanding Officer of
the Battle Group, as well as junior officers and soldiers were eventually accused
of crimes.' Much of this concern was centred on the fact that commanders not
only lacked policing knowledge, but that they could misuse their authority to
thwart criminal investigations, even if inadvertently:
The commanding officer is not a peace officer, is not subject to a peace officer's oath
of office or code of conduct, and has no overriding obligation to advance the admini-
stration of justice. ... Thus, the commanding officer may decide not to investigate a
matter, or may refuse to take action, not because it serves the goals of the [Canadian
Forces], but because it serves the commanding officer's more parochial interests. 59
These commanders assign and prioritize MP duties, directly affect the deploy-
ment of MP detachments, assess MP members' suitability for promotion, and, in
large part, determine the materiel allocation with which they perform their duties.
No other police force in Canada is controlled by its civilian masters to the degree
that military commanders control MP.
The Somalia Inquiry made the following pertinent recommendations:
40.6 Military Police be independent of the chain of command when investigating ma-
jor disciplinary and criminal misconduct.
157. Ibid
158. For a summary of those courts martial and their eventual dispositions, see ibid. at 335-58.
159. Ibid., vol. 5 at 1284.
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40.8 All Military Police, regardless of their specific assignment, be authorized to in-
vestigate suspected misconduct of their own accord unless another Military Police
investigation is under way.
40.11 The Director of Military Police be responsible and accountable to the Chief
of the Defence Staff for all Military Police purposes.160
Many other recommendations were made by the Inquiry. These three are
listed because of their importance to understanding the proposed recommenda-
tions. The changes, however, were never implemented. In spite of this, significant
legislative, regulatory, and procedural changes were made.161 For example, the Na-
tional Investigation Service that investigates serious and sensitive allegations 162 Was
created on 1 September 1997 and is independent of all commanders except its
own, who is a senior MP officer. It is a unit that comes under the command of
the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal. The Inquiry recommended that it be inde-
pendent of him as well, but that was not accepted.
Shortly before the release of the Somalia Inquiry Report, the Special Advisory
Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services released its
report.'6 ' The Special Advisory Group was established by the Minister of National
Defence in January 1997' and released its report three months later. It was
chaired by the former Chief Justice of Canada, Brian Dickson.16 1 With regard
to policing matters, its purpose was:
160. Ibid. at 1296-98.
161. Bill C-25, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to
other Acts, Ist Sess., 36th Parl., 1998. As discussed below, there was some overlap in two
related reports, including similar recommendations such as the need for an independent
criminal investigation service, which became the National Investigation Service.
162. "Serious and sensitive" relate to the complexity of particular cases and the potential for
political and media interest.
163. Department of National Defence, Report of the SpecialAdvisory Group on Military justice and
Military Police Investigation Services (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997) [SAG
Report].
164. Department of National Defence, "Ministerial Direction" [SAG Report, "Ministerial
Discretion"] in SAG Report, ibid. at Annex A.
165. The Right Honourable Brian Dickson fought with distinction as an artillery officer in the
Canadian army during World War II, where he was seriously wounded. A deeper
understanding of the Canadian military and a more empathic approach compared to that of
the Somalia Inquiry Report is apparent in his report.
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[Tbo assess the roles and functions of the Military Police, including the independence
and integrity of the investigative process, against the delivery of effective police
services to the Canadian Forces ... [including, inter alia] the independence of the
Military Police, ... the establishment of a clear command and control framework
for Military police, [and] ... the establishment of an accountability framework in-
cluding an adequate independent oversight mechanism ... .i16
Many matters being dealt with at the same time in the Somalia Inquiry were
also dealt with in the Advisory Group's Report. The two reports came to similar
conclusions in many instances, but differed in tone.16 1
The Advisory Group's Report notes that:
Contrary to many public perceptions, the investigation of service offences is not
the main role of the military police. While investigations are conducted on a routine
basis, most military police members carry on numerous other functions and tasks ...
[in] four core areas, namely, police, security duties, custodial duties and direct
support to military operations.
Following the briefest of discussions of command arrangements in the Forces,
the Report recommends "that command and control of military police required
in the operational support of the commanders remain under their respective
commands ... and that all other military police resources be under the com-
mand and control of the [Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM)]."16 The
Report then goes on to discuss the role of the CFPM including the change in
title of the position to that, and recommends that CFPM have primary respon-
sibility for MP selection and recruiting standards, training, and review of all
MP functions."' All of these recommendations were accepted and are extant.
However, if the language is not as clear as one would hope with regard to the
recommended command and control arrangements, confirmation was provided
by a mandatory review conducted the next year.
166. SAG Report, "Ministerial Direction," supra note 164 at para. 4.
167. See SAG Report, supra note 163 at i. Compare the title of the Somalia Inquiry (Dishonoured
Legacy) to the title of the Foreword of the SAG Report (A Cause for Confidence). The two
reports were issued only about ten weeks apart.
168. SAG Report, ibid. at 13.
169. Ibid. at 29.
170. Ibid.
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In the fall of 1998, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS)"' established
a review by an external panel, again headed by The Right Honourable Brian Dick-
son (the Review Group). The purpose of the review was to assess the effects of the
implementation of the Advisory Group recommendations and, if needed, to
recommend such adjustments as would be advisable." 2 The Review Group's
report"3 was delivered to the VCDS in December of that year shortly after Dick-
son's death. Significant headway was made by the MP during that year-and-a-
half under review, as enormous organizational changes were implemented. The
two areas of interest of the report to be discussed here are chapter two, "Com-
mand and Control of the Military Police," and chapter three, "The Account-
ability Framework."
The Review Group confirmed the Advisory Group's recommendation that
MP at bases and wings should remain under supervision of the operational chain
of command. Strong arguments were made by the CFPM against this arrange-
ment, stating "that it was extremely difficult to have the policies and procedures,
which the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is responsible for, applied consistently
or at all unless there is authority to compel their enforcement through a command
and control structure.""' However, the Review Group found "that all the execu-
tive authority required by the CFPM in order to ensure respect for military police
duties and procedures is provided by the Accountability Framework between the
[VCDS] and the CFPM."'s
The Accountability Framework"' was an agreement entered into to address
concerns of improper command influence. It lays out the respective duties and
obligations of each office holder and "is meant to ensure that the reporting
relationship of the CFPM to the VCDS does not in any way compromise the
independence of the CFPM in relation to the investigatory role of the military
171. Vice Admiral G.L. Garnett. The VCDS is the second-in-command of the Canadian Forces,
and reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff who commands all of the Forces.
172. Department of National Defence (Canada), Terms ofReference-Military Police Services
Review by Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998)
[Review Group], duplicated in Report ofthe Military Police Services Review Group (Ottawa:
Department of National Defence, 1998) at Annex A.
173. Ibid. at Annex B.
174. Ibid at c. 2, para. 3.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid., Annex B. See chapter three for analysis and recommendations.
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police, including the [National Investigation Service].""' The Review Group was
satisfied both with the content of the Agreement and its functionality. It was con-
vinced that any problems with command of MP by military commanders would
be satisfactorily addressed in part "because it is clear that the senior leadership
of the Canadian Forces is committed to ensuring that the chain of command use
its own authority to ensure the implementation of military police policies and
procedures ... [and] to ensure that the CFPM's legitimate concerns are ad-
dressed.""' The Review Group also recommended "that the CFPM be afforded
the ability to comment on the technical skills of military police members" and
that those comments be "considered" for career management, progression and
administration purposes."' These arrangements persist today.
B. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Although only briefly noted, the issue that there can be many masters over civilian
police is simply unknown in common law countries, contrary to the present case
for MP in the Forces. The CFPM commands only a small percentage of MP in
the Forces, while the remainder are commanded by non-MP officers.'s It can be
fairly stated that all civilian police forces have a chief of police who is the sole
authority to task and deploy his or her police officers. This arrangement addresses
the professionalism, competency, and accountability of police.
Serious and sensitive issues in the Canadian Forces are out of the reach of
commanders now because they are handled through the National Investigation
Service (NIS).'"' But the majority of offences are of a lesser magnitudel82 and are
177. Ibid. at c. 3, para. 2.
178. Ibid at c. 3, para. 3.
179. Ibid. at c. 2, para. 5.
180. See below at 46-47.
181. It is important to state that the NIS is neither a separate nor special entity in the Forces. It is
another military unit, in this case coming under the command of the CFPM, composed of
regular MP. Those MP may be posted to the NIS or any other MP unit or detachment from
time to time. However, members of the NIS investigate major crimes, or crimes alleged
against senior officers. Members of the NIS are the only MP who may lay charges under the
Code of Service Discipline.
182. The Canadian Forces has a two-tiered judicial system where minor disciplinary offences are
tried summarily by military commanders with limited punishment authority, whereas formal
trials resembling civilian criminal trials are found in the court martial system. In the fiscal
year 2007-2008, there were 2,035 summary trials conducted compared to seventy-eight
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handled locally by commanders and MP who are not in the NIS. As we have seen,
the fact that MP have other military tasks does not differ greatly from civilian
police, and so justifications for the special military command arrangements fail.
As it pertains particularly to service offence investigations, which include criminal
offences, the CFPM needs the specific independence and authority to task, deploy,
and re-deploy MP and equipment as he or she deems required. The NIS, for ex-
ample, may be in charge of an investigation but require additional police resources
for assistance. Currently, though, the CFPM's only option in such a situation is
to request the cooperation of local commanders whose MP he or she needs to task.
Although he or she has the right to go to the VCDS to force a recalcitrant
commander to cooperate, this is impractical except in extreme situations. On the
other hand, should the CFPM have command over all MP, he or she would,
when required, be able to "reach down" to assign duties to Base or Wing MP.
The requirement for CFPM to have command authority has other practical
consequences unrelated to investigations. The Canadian Forces is currently heavily
tasked to provide members for overseas operations, including those in Afghanistan.
Service members are typically assigned to be in theatre for approximately six
months, although longer tours are not uncommon. Prior to deployment, they
participate in a significant amount of training. This commonly involves up to
nine months of training and administration, much of which is often at a distant
base. Following a tour in the field, most members will be entitled to long leave and
administrative time to prepare them to reintegrate into their normal jobs. A tour,
then, can take a member away from his or her regular job for often fifteen months
or more. With approximately 2,900 Forces members currently serving overseas
on a multitude of operations,' and at two tours per year, the disruption to nor-
mal base duties is significant. Not only do holes have to be filled in important
jobs that cannot be undertaken in such an absence, ensuring that they have high-
quality soldiers who are capable of handling those overseas operations is also
crucial. Naturally, commanders turn to the CFPM when there are deployment
problems with MP or other issues and yet he or she has no authority to ensure
courts martial. See Department of National Defence, Annual Report oftheJudgeAdvocate
General to the Minister of National Defence on the Administration of Military justice in the
Canadian Forces: A Review From 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 (Ottawa: Office of the
Judge Advocate General) at 13, 136.
183. See Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, "International Operations," online: <http://
www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/index-eng.asp>. Figures are stated as of 16 June 2010.
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control or the quality of the personnel being deployed. The most that he or she
can do at present, as with surges in investigations, is to negotiate with com-
manders who have their own parochial interests. Frustration and inefficiency
can result.'4
The current command-driven arrangement appears to resemble a town
mayor having his own personal police force, and this provides an appearance of
improper influence. There are no orders, directions, or extant policies which
guide the relationship between commanders and MP, and the CFPM has little
or no influence over the quality of policing except after the fact.'" Importantly,
and unlike ministers responsible for police in the federal or provincial governments,
the commanders who exercise executive authority over the MP do so without
specific statutory authority, except for that of command generally. This is proba-
bly a historical anomaly more than a conscious decision of Parliament. Indeed,
the MP appear to be the only police force in Canada that does not have their own
specific legislation; rather, they are mentioned in very limited terms in the Na-
tional Defence Act, relating to their jurisdiction to make arrests and deal with cer-
tain complaints.' Consequently, other command-related problems arise regularly.
MP are spread across the entire country on navy, army, and air force bases
and wings, commonly in small detachments of ten to twenty MP members. They
are normally commanded by a junior officer in the rank of captain, but because
of operational deployments, required professional courses, or other tasks and rea-
sons, the local Detachment Commander is not infrequently a non-commissioned
member of the rank of warrant officer or sergeant. Base and wing commanders
are commonly colonels, a rank that is eight levels higher in the hierarchy than
the warrant officer, and three ranks more senior to the captain. As rank plays
strongly in the military, the differences inevitably affect relations. This can cause
the local Detachment Commander, who depends upon being perceived by his
commander as cooperative and productive and who has otherwise no policing
priority guidelines, to be agreeable to those priorities that the commander sees
as important. MP are then liable to be employed in a manner that does not opti-
184. The author has witnessed these exact problems on a regular basis during his two
appointments as a military legal adviser to the Office of the CFPM.
185. See QR&O, supra note 22 at art. 22.04; National DefenceAct, supra note 10, Part IV-
Complaints About or By Military Police.
186. National Defence Act, ibid., s. 156.
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mally use their policing training and skills, and may result in poor policing. Its
effects, however, will probably not become apparent until "the wheel comes off."'"
The concerns argued by the CFPM in 1998 to the Review Group relating to
the difficulties of enforcing MP policies and procedures.. continue to this day.'
Although the CFPM is now a commander and no longer simply a staff officer,'90
his or her command is restricted to the NIS, the Canadian Forces Service Prison
and Detention Barracks, the Canadian Forces Military Police Academy, and the
Military Police Security Service, totalling about only 10 per cent of the approxi-
mately two thousand MP members in the Forces. The remaining MP continue
to be commanded by non-police officers. These officers evaluate and control the
careers of MP with little or no input from the CFPM or his or her staff. Policing
priorities and policies will necessarily be significantly affected by the wishes of
local commanders over what distant Ottawa may want; indeed, there is no effec-
tive means of ensuring the priorities of the CFPM are enforced or restricted. This
is not to suggest that improper direction is being given by local commanders,"'
but as the Somalia Report suggested, the local commanders will inevitably have
their own "parochial interests."192
Being in a hierarchical organization where authority rests in command and
rank, the CFPM has no effective legal or lawful control over MP except for his or
187. Beare, "Steeped in Politics," supra note 144 at 316, citing Robert Reiner, The Politics ofthe
Police (London: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 9.
188. See 42-43, above.
189. See Department of National Defence, 1920-1 (DPM Police) Military Police Issues, 4 October
2007 [on file with author]; Military Police Command and Control, Presentation to Command
Council by CFPM, 17 October 2008 [on file with author); 1180-1 (D NDHQSec)
Commanders'Council Meeting 05/08 Held on 17 Oct 08-Record ofDecisions, 31 October
2008; Military Police Command and Control Update, Presentation to Command Council by
CFPM, 25 November 2008 [on file with author]; and VCDS 5225-1 (EA CFPM) Military
Police C2, 31 December 2008 [on file with author].
190. Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Organization Order 9507-Canadian
Forces Military Police Group. This order states that the Canadian Forces Military Police
Group is a formation which is commanded by the CFPM.
191. Indeed, there is little or no publicly available information suggesting significant problems
recently. However, the concern is to address likely and obvious issues before there are problems.
192. See the text accompanying note 160, above. However, that text deals with criminal
investigations, which is not the case here. Nonetheless, unintentional and indirect effects on
investigations are liable to occur where commanders' priorities affect the numbers of
available MP and their resources.
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her own 10 per cent. Yet, he or she is responsible for effective policing in the Forces.
The CFPM "is responsible for developing policies and plans to guide the man-
agement of security and military police resources of the Department."'" Literally,
this suggests that the CFPM is only responsible for "policies and plans" related
to MP; practically, however, he or she will inevitably be the one everyone looks
to when there are problems anywhere related to MP. But with responsibility must
come authority, of which, for some 90 per cent of the Forces's MP, the CFPM
has little or none.
Changes, however, need not be complex or difficult. Command is not an ab-
solute in the Forces. The military functions regularly on something less than full
command. Command relations are defined in the doctrine manual titled CF
Operations.'" There is a hierarchy of command and, while avoiding technical
definitions, it is fair to explain them as having at the highest level "Operational
Command," which includes complete authority to assign missions or tasks, de-
ploy units, reassign forces, or to retain or delegate authority as may be necessary.
The next lower'level is "Operational Control," which is a delegated authority
allowing the commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific mis-
sions or tasks and is usually limited by time or location. There are lesser levels of
command as well. By maintaining a higher level of command, that commander
has ultimate authority to take back any delegated command authority. It can be
temporarily for a specific purpose, or permanently. Orders the commander issues
would be binding on his or her subordinates, including those troops under
another commander's delegated authority, although it would be improper to
interfere with that delegated commander except in the case of pressing opera-
tional considerations. At present, local commanders effectively have Operational
Command over their MP, and CFPM has no command relationship. This is
surely at odds with public expectations.
Recall that the Supreme Court has made it clear in Campbell that police
must be independent of the executive, at least for investigative purposes, although
there may be a closer relationship for other purposes.'" The same case supported
193. Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, "About CFPM - Mission and Vision," online: <http://
www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/apm-agplindex-eng.asp>.
194. Canada, National Defence, CF Operations (B-GJ-005-300/FP-000) (Ottawa: Department of
National Defence, 2000), online: <http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/docs/B-GJ-005-
300_e.pdf>.
195. Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 29.
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the proposition in Enever that police have "original authority,""' or inherent
powers. Although their powers are proscribed by legislation... and jurispru-
dence' within their areas of jurisdiction, the MP enjoy the full panoply of those
powers which all police forces have while being under the direct supervision and
responsibility of the chief of police. The relationship with the executive can be
realized either directly, through the responsible minister, or indirectly through
police services boards. The boards provide continuity, stability, and insulation
for both the executive and the police from the demands of politics of the day.'
Finally, Canadians can properly expect an analogous standard of accountability
and professionalism in the MP that is comparable to that of any other police
force, but for bona fide military requirements. Those bona fide military re-
quirements appear from our study to be limited to the requirement for the MP
to be responsive to their military commanders in the unique areas of military
operations that are not found in other police forces. The MP's unique duties
include responsibility for prisoners of war, detainees, stragglers, refugees, and
displaced persons on the battlefield; naval ship security in foreign ports; air-
field security; and the general security of the Department of National Defence.
As it pertains, however, to the overall management, command and control, selec-
tion, training, employment, and distribution of the MP, as well as all matters
dealing with criminal and disciplinary investigations within the Forces, there ap-
pears to be no bona fide requirement that would displace the standard of these
matters being the direct responsibility of the chief of police or the CFPM.
196. Ibid.
197. National Defence Act, supra note 10, s. 156.
198. See R. v. Nolan, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 1212; R. v. Haynes (1994), 130 N.S.R. (2d) 311 (N.S.
C.A.). These two cases, amongst others, speak to the jurisdiction of Military Police which is
generally limited to those persons who are subject to the Code ofService Discipline pursuant
to s. 60 of the National Defence Act, supra note 10. Importantly, Nolan states at para. 18 that
although provisions defining those persons who are "peace officers" pursuant to the Criminal
Code, supra note 29, s. 2 expands Military Police jurisdiction to persons who are not subject
to the Code ofService Discipline, the provision is limited and not intended to extend that
authority for them "to act as 'peace officers' throughout a province and in relation to all residents
of a province, duplicating the role and function of the civil police."
199. See Part II(F), above. In my discussion above, it is important to note that all of the examples
dealt with the RCMP, who are directly controlled by their minister and do not have a police
services board. The point is made not to suggest that direct ministerial control is inherently
less effective or accountable. Rather, it is to highlight the greater risk of parochial influences
affecting the police, particularly in areas where the use of their discretion is essential.
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C. A PROPOSED WAY AHEAD
With the foregoing in mind, it is proposed that two fundamental steps take
place to align MP governance with other Canadian police accountability
standards. The first is to place all MP under the operational command of the
CFPM. The second is the establishment of a Military Police Services Board
(MP Services Board).
The newly established MP Services Board is envisaged as a unique type of
police services board. It would be responsible for the provision of multi-layered
governance oversight at the national, regional, and local levels of command to
govern the traditional roles of MP in support of operational military command-
ers. It would oversee the traditional roles of enforcing good order and discipline
of military members, as well as such other legitimate military duties as com-
manders deem are, under all the prevailing circumstance, best executed by MP.
The multi-layered unique board is necessary to account for bona fide military
requirements such as unity of command and the national, as opposed to local,
nature of the Forces, while still addressing unique local concerns. Further, the
Board would ensure that a level of expertise in policing and military issues
would develop and thereby minimize the risk of commanders misusing their
MP for their "parochial interests."
The Board, with the advice of the CFPM, would issue policy and task pri-
orities to MP units and elements depending upon their respective operational
responsibilities and needs. The orders of the Board would be the CFPM's re-
sponsibility to execute. Although detailing the make-up and responsibilities of
the Board, including its various levels, is beyond the scope of this article, it is
expected that direction from each level would, in effect, be a subset of its supe-
rior board's directions. For example, the national level would issue general,
broad direction which would apply to most MP. It would decide upon the allo-
cation of MP members to commands, and govern their general duties and au-
thority to use or trial new equipment and methods of policing. The national
direction would also guide and constrain each of the next subordinate levels.
That next subordinate board would do the same for its own bases and units.
For example, this level might govern the Navy, Army, or Air Force and provide
direction which is applicable to the whole of each. At each level, a smaller sub-
board would decide matters within its respective sphere of responsibility. Each
level would be constrained by the direction of its superior board's directions.
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This would be quite intelligible within the military as it parallels the means by
which military orders are commonly issued.
It would be important that directions from the Board and its sub-elements
be only issued to the affected MP Detachment Commander by or on behalf of
the CFPM. Local military commanders would have limited authority to issue
orders directly to MP. However, it would be quite normal for particularly routine
matters of a local nature that the CFPM could delegate his or her authority to a
local sub-board for the sake of expediency. Again, each level would only be able
to execute those tasks which fall within their delegated authority. Unusual and
unique conditions would need to be approved by the higher command within
the MP Branch, and perhaps by the national Board.
In this construct, it is expected that the CFPM would be uniquely respon-
sible for all military policing matters within the Canadian Forces, much as a
chief of police is for his or her force. The training, administration, discipline,
and accountability of all MP would be the responsibility of the CFPM and or-
ders to MP would only be issued by or on behalf of the CFPM. However,
much as municipal police services boards are responsive to the needs of their
communities through their municipal councils and police services boards, MP
would, in similar fashion, be responsive to their respective commanders whom
they support through the MP Services Board. For example, the policing priori-
ties of the Army commander would likely differ from that of the Air Force
commander. The Army commander could be very concerned during prepara-
tions for a pending operation overseas that there is an inordinate drug abuse
problem with his soldiers which needs to be addressed. The Air Force com-
mander, on the other hand, might well have ongoing but not extraordinary
drug abuse concerns amongst his members, but has considerable concerns
about sabotage and general security on his air bases. Both are equally valid
concerns Canadians can confidently expect that their military commanders
would address with the support of their MP. But commanders, whether at the
international, national, regional, or local levels each would need to decide for
themselves their priorities and then be prepared to be held accountable. MP
must be able to respond to, and indeed in their own turn be responsive to,
their respective commanders for the policing priorities which they would be
assigned by their local sub-board. The accountability of the executive (i.e.,
commanders) would be clearly shown in the written directions of the MP
Services Board. The CFPM would be accountable through his reports to the
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Board for those matters within the discretion of the police for which they are
independent of their commanders.
Orders issued by the Board to the CFPM would provide the governance
of MP in like manner to that of other police forces, while command of all
MP by the CFPM would ensure that he or she has the legal authority to de-
ploy, re-deploy, train, assess, and otherwise manage the MP under command.
Further, this would ensure the means for the CFPM to override improper
command orders which, particularly in the law enforcement role, impinge
upon the required police independence that the courts require and other au-
thorities support.
This model would ensure reasonable and accountable governance, pro-
viding effective military policing services where and how such governance is
required. In the same vein, effective and indeed measurable guidelines would
be provided so that new junior MP officers who are local Detachment Com-
manders have the guidance and support they need when confronted with dif-
ficult or complex situations for which they may otherwise lack experience.
Commanders, too, would have a clear understanding as to what they can use
their MP for, and under what conditions, or when they might be withdrawn
for other duties.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Military Police Branch has evolved considerably from its humble beginnings
in Canada a century ago. Much has changed. MP must now be qualified in the
same type of police training as their civilian counterparts, as well as qualify in
unique military training. They now have control over the selection and police
training of their members and have an independent criminal investigation unit
which is outside of the chain of command. Further, there are robust police
complaints mechanisms in place which are regularly used and tested.200
However, more needs to be done before problems arise, and problems are
foreseeable. For Canadians to be confident that MP have the control and com-
plete oversight mechanisms to ensure proper policing as is expected in any com-
munity in Canada, important changes must be made. The CFPM, as the "chief
of police" of the Canadian Forces, must command all MP as all chiefs of police
200. See Military Police Complaints Commission, "Chair's Message," online: <http://www.mpcc-
cppm.gc.calindex-eng.aspx>; QR6-O, supra note 22, art. 22.04.
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command their constables. Finally, MP standards and requirements need to be
effectively meshed with commanders' needs, both in combat operations and in
garrison. To do this, a MP Services Board must be established which accounts
for operational, national, regional, and local concerns. This will complement the
"review" governance system that is already well-established and will complete the
necessary overall governance structure for the complete professionalization of MP
as recognized as essential in law and practice for all police throughout Canada.

